We introduce the concept of escrowed identity, an application of key-escrow ideas to the problem of authentication. In escrowed identity, one party A does not give his identity to another party B, but rather gives him information that would allow an authorized third party E to determine A's identity. However, B receives a guarantee that E can indeed determine A's identity. We consider a number of possible features of escrowed identity schemes, and describe a variety of implementations that achieve various subsets of these features. In particular, we observe that group signature schemes can be used to escrow identities, achieving most (though not all) of the desired features.
Introduction
We consider a client that obtains regular or continual access to a service or facility. Examples include driving a toll highway with a regular commuter pass, parking regularly in a garage, entering one's club premises, or using internet services. In order to get the service, the client must convince the gate keeper that he is entitled to the service. The client can do this by identifying himself at the entrance. But must he really identify himself? Such the application of key escrow ideas: authentication and identity schemes.
Some distinctive features of this application are that Escrowed identity may actually enhance privacy. By default, many identity schemes require a person to give their entire identity \up front." A protocol in which this information is only released under special circumstances may prove an acceptable, and more private substitute. Escrowed identity schemes work to the advantage of at least one of the parties invoking them. In traditional key escrow systems, both party only lose by following the escrow system, and have everything to gain by bypassing it (which is generally quite easy to do).
Escrowed Identity
An escrowed identity system consists of the following parties:
Identi er: The identi er is the client who identi es himself to the veri er (the gate-keeper).
Issuer: The issuer issues certi cates to the identi er that allow him to identify himself in an escrowed manner.
Veri er: The veri er is typically the access provider who veri es the rst-tier identity process as well as the escrow proof for the second-tier identity.
Escrow Agent(s): The escrow agent(s) use information forwarded by the veri er to make a second-tier identi cation of the identi er. These parties execute the following protocols:
Initializing the system: The certi cate issuer, and in some cases the escrow agent, computes whatever private information and publishes whatever public information is necessary to initialize the system.
Issuing a certi cate: The certi cate issuer gives a certi cate to the identi er.
Checking the weak identity: The identi er convinces the veri er that he has a certi cate, gives an escrowed certi cate and convinces the veri er that the escrowed certi cate is valid.
Recovering the complete identity: The veri er gives the escrow agent(s) the escrowed certi cate, and the escrow agent(s) recovers the identity of the identi er.
There are a number of desirable features of escrowed identity systems. Ideally, one would like an e cient protocol that achieves all of these features. However, as we discuss below, there is a tradeo between feature coverage and e ciency among the known escrowed identity protocols. Hence, we will describe for each implementation the features it does or does not achieve.
The following features are most pertinent to the notion of escrowed identity:
Valid rst-tier identi cation: If a user receives a legitimate certi cate from the issuer, and if he follows his protocol, then he will succeed in convincing a veri er that he is a legitimate user (i.e. has a certi cate) with probability 1. Conversely, a computationally bounded user that has not been issued a certi cate by the issuer will fail to convince the veri er of having a certi cate with probability almost 1. (This implies that producing a certi cate without the issuer's private key is computationally hard.)
Secure second-tier identity: After the veri er has seen one or more rst-tier identi cation proofs, he cannot fake a legitimate identity in the sense described above.
Guaranteed escrow for second-tier identity: A computationally bounded user can interactively prove with high con dence that he has escrowed his second-tier identity; the escrow agency can determine this identity from the transcript of this proof. (This imply that producing a second certi cate from a given legitimate on is computationally hard). One may further demand that even if many identi ers collaborate, the escrow agency may still recover the identity of one of them with high probability.
Resistance to impersonation: The escrow agency, even after recovering many identities of many users from the transcripts of weak identity proofs, cannot fake any legitimate identity in the sense described above. In particular, this implies that the escrowed identity does not reveal the certi cate of the user. Similarly, one can require that the certi cate issuer cannot fake the identity of someone already in the system. Separability: The escrow agency is completely independent of the other parties unless a request to uncover the second-tier identity is made. An issuer, veri er and user can set up an identi cation system without ever registering with or communicating in any way with the escrow agent. The escrow agency is only \woken up" when there is a request to revoke anonymity.
Containing the escrow agent
Introducing an escrow agent into a system almost inevitably reduces its security. However, the nature of the problem and the separability property allows us to minimize the damage. By separating the escrow agency from the initialization and normal operation of the identi cation system, we can have the agency be dormant most of the time. For example, if the escrow agency is implemented with secure hardware, this hardware can be stored in a secure bank vault until needed. This helps to reduce the chance that an escrow agent will be compromised.
A further check on a rogue escrow agent is that the veri er has to ask for a more precise identi cation. Key escrow for communication is typically coercive, and requires that someone be able to obtain the ciphertext of any two people's communications without their request or consent. Thus, the possibilities for widespread abuse are greater than with our scenario. Nevertheless, it is only prudent to allow for multiple escrow agents; the escrow agents in most of our protocols can be made to work using simple group cryptography (e.g. 15, 30] ).
History and related work
An earlier version of this work appeared in 20], using cut-and-choose techniques for the zero-knowledge proofs. The current version describes much more e cient implementations based on group signature schemes. Group signature schemes were introduced by Chaum and Heyst 12] , and subsequently developed in 13, 10, 28, 11] . Independently and concurrently with 20], Camenisch and Stadler 11] developed new schemes for e cient group signatures, one of which can quite e ciently achieve most of our goals; we describe this solution in Section 3.
At the heart of escrowed identity and group signatures is an e cient proof that an encrypted value possesses some property. Frankel Micali 26] has shown how to use a dormant agent for certi ed mail.
Road map
In Section 2 we describe some of the building blocks we use for our protocols. In Section 3 we discuss how to implement identity escrow using group signature schemes. In Section 4 we show how to achieve stronger separability . In Section 5 we show an implementation of an escrowed identity scheme based on the El-Gamal encryption and signature schemes.
Preliminaries
We describe some of the basic building blocks we use in our protocol.
Bit Commitments
We work in the argument framework of Brassard, Chaum and Cr epeau 7]. In this paradigm, all parties are assumed to be computationally bounded. It is shown in 7] how to commit to bits in statistical zero-knowledge, based on the intractability of certain number-theoretic problems. D amgard, Pedersen and P tzmann 14] give a protocol for e ciently committing to and revealing strings of bits in statistical zero-knowledge, relying only on the existence of collision-intractable hash functions. This scheme is quite practical. For simplicity, we will simply speak of committing to and revealing bits when referring to the protocols of 14].
In some implementations we also commit to strings by probabilistic encryption 19] using the public key of the escrow agency. These commitments are only computationally secure. Furthermore, they allow for the escrow agents to recover the values of these commitments in addition to those revealed by the identi er in the course of the zero-knowledge proofs.
The El-Gamal signature and encryption schemes
We base one implementation of escrowed identity on the El-Gamal signature and encryption schemes 16], which we summarize, following 31], with slight modi cations to suit our purposes.
In both schemes, there is a common prime p, which for our purposes is of the form 2q + 1 where q is a prime. Let g 2 Z p have order q. For the encryption scheme each party has a private key X 2 Z q and a public key Y = g X . For the signature scheme we denote the secret key by S 2 Z q and the public key by P = q S .
To encrypt a message M 2 Z p given public key P, the sender uniformly generates r 2 Z q and computes E Y (M; r) = (g r ; MY r ). The decryption function is given by D X (A; B) = B=A X .
The signer signs a message M 2 Z p?1 as follows. 
Signing the \0" document is not secure
We remark on a weakness in the El-Gamal signature scheme. The document \0" can be signed e ciently by a party that does not have the secret key S. For example, by setting a = P and b = ?P mod q we have P a a b = P P P ?P = q 0 . More generally, we can set a = P k mod p and setting b = ?a=k mod q. For this reason, we use El-Gamal signatures for 1 instead of 0. We assume that given a number of signatures for 1 it is impossible to generate a di erent signature for 1. This assumption is plausible, but we do not know of any more standard assumptions that imply it.
The RSA encryption scheme
In the RSA encryption scheme the public key consists of n = pq where p and q are prime and an exponent e, where e is relatively prime to n and (n). A message M is encrypted by computing M e mod n. The private key consists of d such that de = 1 mod (p ? 1)(q ? 1) (strictly, de = 1 mod (n) su ces), and M e is decrypted by computing (M e ) d = M mod n.
We make an additional assumption beyond the security of RSA. We assume that for a random it is hard to nd (a; b) such that a e ? b e = mod n. Furthermore, we assume that given a set of such pairs f(a i ; b i )g it is hard to generate a new pair. Given d, it is easy to generate a pair (a; b) with given value of a e by computing a = (a e ) d and b = (a e ? ) d .
Camenisch and Stadler 11] use essentially the same assumption, and have pointed out that the system is not secure for very small e (2 or 3); the pairs (a; b) fall on a low degree curve, which can be used as a basis for an attack. However, a large e doesn't seem vulnerable to such an attack.
Using group signatures to escrow identity
Borrowing freely from the exposition in 11], we describe the basics of group signatures. We then proceed to describe how a particular implementation can be used to give an escrowed identity system with most of the desired features.
Group signatures
A group signature system consists of a group manager that oversees a group of signers. The group manager can allow other players to join the group. Any member of the group can sign a message on behalf of the group. The group manager can determine precisely who within the group signed the message, but no one else can.
This framework suggests the following set of protocols for something close to escrowed identi cation. Being issued a certi cate corresponds to joining the signature group. The identi er can identify himself to the veri er by signing a (random) message of the veri er's choosing. To avoid replay and timing attacks, this message should include the (approximate) time and the veri er's name. To revoke anonymity the group manager determines who actually signed the message.
However, in the reduction outlined above, the group manager plays two roles: the issuer and the escrow agency. To obtain an escrowed identity system, we need to split these roles. As noted in 11], one of their implementations ( 11] , Section 6) allows for a considerable, though not complete separation between these roles. For completeness, we explicitly describe how this separation is made.
The Camenisch-Stadler construction
We brie y describe the parts of the Camenisch-Stadler construction that are relevant to separating the roles of the issuer and the escrow agency. We omit quantities, guarantees, protocols and other issues that are not directly relevant to this goal.
The group manager generates an RSA modulus n = pq, RSA exponents e 1 ; e 2 , a cyclic group G = hgi, of order n, an element h 2 G, an El Gamal private-key, public key pair, ( ; y R = h ). It publishes (n; e 1 ; e 2 ; G; g; h; y R ).
The identi er randomly generates a private x and computes y = x e 1 and z = g y . As part of the registration process, the identi er sends z to the group manager. The only operation the group manager performs relying on its private information is the computation ofỹ 1=e 2 for someỹ (used as part of a blind decryption to generate the certi cate).
The signature incorporates a proof of knowledge of a valid certi cate and the private key, x. As one part of the signature, the identi er sends (y r R ; h r g y ), which is the El-Gamal encryption of z. A group manager can thus recover z, allowing it to determine the identity of the signer. The signing process requires knowledge of x and y.
The group manager can be split into an issuer and an escrow agency as follows. The issuer generates n = pq and the corresponding RSA exponents. It then registers n with the escrow agency. The escrow agency chooses G; g; h; and y R appropriately and sends G; g; h; r R to the issuer, keeping private. It is typically not hard to verify that G is of the correct order. Also, the issuer can ensure that h is \random enough" by requiring that is be, for example, a hash of g.
The issuer can register participants without knowing . The escrow agency can determine z without knowing the factorization of n. Once it has recovered z, it must go back to the issuer to determine who actually corresponds to z.
Features obtained by the Camenisch-Stadler construction
First, we note that for this and all the (serious) protocols proposed in this paper, we argue purely heuristically. All statements about security are implicitly preceded by, \Well, it sure looks to us that...". An interesting open question is to obtain e cient schemes based on well known hardness assumptions.
The above construction achieves three of our desired features, and achieves a weak form of the other two. The validity of the rst-tier identi cation and the security of the second-tier identi cation derive from the corresponding security properties of group signature schemes. Furthermore, the Camenisch-Stadler construction also achieves a strong resistance to impersonation. The group center cannot forge a message from a group member, essentially because the group manager never learns x and y; this inability extends to the issuer and the escrow agency (even working in concert).
Guaranteed escrow of the second-tier identi cation is in a sense also guaranteed by the properties of group signature schemes. However, note that the the escrow agency and the issuer must work in concert to reveal the identity. Thus, if the issuer later refuses to help, or no longer exists, no second-tier identi cation may be obtained. This problem may be ameliorated by having the issuer continually inform the escrow agency of the identity corresponding to each z. For some applications, this weakness may be a strength, in that it provides another layer of protection for the anonymity of the identi er.
A weak form of separability obtained, in that the escrow agency is not involved with any transaction. However, the escrow agency has to be contacted to initialize a group. For some applications, this may be reasonable, but it is not suitable when forming groups should be a lightweight operation and the escrow agency is to be kept dormant nearly all the time.
A scheme achieving full separation
The greatest limitation of the group-signature based schemes is that the issuer and escrow agent cannot be completely separated -they must communicate when the system is set up and whenever anonymity must be revoked. It is of interest to see how much separation is indeed possible. Using general zero-knowledge proofs for NP assertions, great exibility may be obtained, though with a complete loss of practicality. To allow person X into the group, the issuer can simply sign a message stating that X is in the group. To identify itself, the identi er simply (probabilistically) encrypts this message and signature in the escrow agent's public key, and gives a zero-knowledge proof that were the message decrypted it would be a valid signed message authorizing entry (further details, such as avoiding resending attacks, omitted).
We give an escrowed identi cation system that is vastly more e cient than the above system, but substantially less e cient than the group-signature based schemes. In its basic form, it allows for impersonation attacks by the issuer; as recent work in progress we believe we can eliminate this attack with a somewhat more complex scheme.
The protocols
Central to our protocols is an RSA public key consisting of n = pq and e (relatively prime to (n)), with a secret key d such that de = 1 mod (p ? 1)(q ? 1). In addition there is a new parameter, , that can be either set randomly or to a xed number di erent from 0 or 1 (but must be xed throughout the execution of the scheme).
A certi cate is a pair (a; b) such that a e ?b e = . Given d, one can easily generate a certi cate, even if a or a e is xed, since b = (a e ? ) d mod n. We assume that a and b are relatively prime to n. The structure of these certi cates follows closely the methodology of 11] (and was independently put forth in 20]).
Initializing the system
To set up the system, the issuer chooses n; e; d and as above, and publishes (n; e; d). Note that unlike the previous scheme, the escrow agency has no part in setting up the system. We only assume that any potential escrow agent has a public key.
Issuing a certi cate
The center chooses a valid certi cate (a; b) such that a e contains (say, in its low order bits) the name of the identi er, and gives (a; b) to the identi er. As another security check, a can actually contain a compact signature by the issuer; anyone can verify that only the issuer made a.
Checking the weak ( rst tier) identity
On a high level, the identi er proves that he knows a proper certi cate (a; b) by a cut-and-choose protocol. The identi er and the veri er may choose their escrow agent independently during each identi cation session.
First, the identi er chooses independently and uniformly at random two numbers a 1 ; b 1 both relatively prime to n. He then sets a 2 ; b 2 to be the numbers satisfying a = a 1 a 2 and b = b 1 b 2 . This partition is done to later hide the actual value of a and b from the veri er. The identi er also chooses uniformly and independently at random two numbers x; y such that x and y are relatively prime to n. 
Recovering the complete (second tier) identity
The veri er gives the transcript of the proof to the escrow agent. Since the commitment on the (a 1 ) e and (a 2 ) e were done by probabilistic encryption, using the escrow agent's public key, the escrow agent can read the value of (a 1 ) e and (a 2 ) e and thus get a e . This value plainly reveals the identity of the user; no further consultation with the issuer is required. One subtlety is that there may be multiple values, either because the prover cheated successfully in some rounds or because multiple identi ers colluded. These are thwarted by having the equality check; nearly all the recovered a e 's will be the same, and will be equal to an a from a certi cate known to the identi er.
Features of the identi cation system
As with the group-signature based schemes, all of the arguments for the security of this scheme is heuristic; the same caveats about statements of security apply. Some necessary hardness assumptions that we make are that it is hard to nd a pair (a; b) so that a e ? b e = mod n (so no one can fake an identity), that given (a; b) satisfying the above, it is hard to produce a di erent pair (a 0 ; b 0 ) with the same property (so the user must escrow the real a e ), and that given a e it is not possible to nd the appropriate (a; b) (so that the escrow agency cannot fake the user identity). The last condition is implied by the rst one, since it is easy to produce a e for any arbitrary a.
Further discussion of this assumption is given in 11]. It appears di cult for an outsider to mimic a group member. The interactive proof does imply that the intruder has a valid certi cate. Assuming that these are hard to generate (given all the side information available to an attacker), valid rst-tier identi cation appears to hold. Similarly, the zeroknowledge proof implies that with high probability the escrow agent will be able to recover a e for a valid certi cate, implying that the second-tier identity has been escrowed. However, without the escrow agent, the proof of knowledge of a certi cate is zero knowledge, so the second-tier identity is secure.
The strongest feature of the protocol is its separability. The escrow agent is completely uninvolved unless asked to revoke anonymity. Indeed, the identi er and veri er have complete freedom of who they pick as their agent for any individual transaction. Anyone with a public key known to the identi er and veri er may be designated an escrow agent, with no prior interaction required.
The weakest feature of the protocol as it now stands is its resistance to impersonation. The issuer can forge any player's identity as soon as a certi cate is issued. However, it can be veri ed that knowing (a 1 ) e and (a 2 ) e and seeing the rest of the proof reveals nothing about b. Hence, even after determining the identi er's identity, the escrow agency and the veri er cannot team up to impersonate the identi er. Hence, this system works best when the issuer is under high security and preferably is destroyed (erases its private data) when no further certi cates are to be issued. We note that since it's sole operation is an RSA decryption, it can be implemented via group cryptography, increasing the security of the system. We also note as a result of this weakness, the escrow agent's goal is to determine the identi er, but not to prove this identity.
Recent enhancements
We report on work in progress that will be described in detail in an upcoming longer version of this paper. We believe we can modify the above protocol, with some loss of e ciency, to make it resistant to impersonation. We brie y describe the basic tricks involved.
First, one can achieve resistance to impersonation in a similar manner as in 11] by having a be g r for some element g 2 Z n , where the random r is chosen by the identi er. Care must be taken so that this discrete log problem is hard. As part of the identi cation process, the identi er proves knowledge of r, which is never revealed to anyone. Unfortunately, this way of choosing a doesn't allow the identi er's name to be encoded. So instead, three certi cates (a 1 ; b 1 ), (a 2 ; b 2 ) and (a 3 ; b 3 ) are generated, such that the identi er knows the discrete log of a 1 , and a 3 contains his identity.
A potential impersonation attack by the issuer would simply substitute a new value of a 1 whose discrete log is known by the issuer. However, given the existence of space e cient signature schemes, a 3 and a 1 can be \linked" by the identi er, so that only that value of a 1 can be used to establish someone's identity, and only the identi er can make such a link.
Essentially, a 3 contains the identi er's signature for a 1 . However, it isn't possible to directly prove in zero knowledge that these committed pairs are linked (they aren't normally revealed). One attack is for two identi ers to mix their pairs, so that no linked pairs are recovered. To thwart this attack, a 1 ; a 2 and a 3 are additionally constrained so that a 3 = a 1 + a 2 , and this relation is proven during the identi cation protocol, using standard cut and choose techniques. The issuer can arrange things so that for any 3 valid certi cates a 3 = a 1 + a 2 implies that a 3 and a 1 are linked. Many, many details omitted.
An El-Gamal based identi cation system
Given the rather nonstandard and quite similar assumptions used by the previous two schemes, one would like to make sure that plausible schemes can be based on alternative cryptographic functions. We construct an identity escrow system using the El-Gamal signature scheme as the underlying cryptographic primitive. Unfortunately, the protocol is even more ine cient than the last, and does not enjoy its strengths, but serves as evidence that identity escrow does not rely on what is essentially a single nonstandard assumption. We rst give a high level discussion of this scheme.
Initializing the system
The issuer begins by choosing keys for the encryption scheme and for the signature scheme. For both schemes he chooses a big prime p satisfying p = 2q + 1 for a prime q, and a random quadratic residuosity g in Z p . The issuer then chooses a secret key S for the signature scheme and computes the related public key P = g S mod p. The escrow agent chooses a secret key X for its encryption scheme and computes Y = g X mod p. The issuer publishes g; p; P; Y . In the sequel all operations are done modulo p unless otherwise stated.
Issuing a certi cate
The valid certi cates will be the set of all signatures on the number 1.
Namely, legitimate identities will be all pairs (a; b) satisfying P a a b = g mod p.
The issuer selects a random signature of \1" which is a pair (a; b), and sends (a; b) to the identi er. Speci cally, the issuer chooses a random number r 2 0::q ? 1] and computes a = g r . (Note that a is a random quadratic residue modulo p.) The issuer tries again if a = q, 1 otherwise, the issuer computes the number b satisfying aS + rb = 1 mod q. (a standard calculation in the eld Z q .) The issuer sends (a; b) to the identi er and saves a to allow it to help the escrow agent revoke anonymity.
Checking the weak ( rst tier) identity
We go into the details of this process in Section 5.1 below. But in a nutshell, in order to identify himself, the identi er provides an El-Gamal encryption of a, and then proves in perfect zero knowledge that he knows a pair (a; b) such that P a a b = g mod p and such that a is encrypted in the cipher-text he provided.
Recovering the complete (second tier) identity
If the identity of a user has to be revealed, the veri er sends the escrow agent the encryption of a. The escrow agent decrypts it and, with the help of the issuer, determines which identi er had that value of a.
Verifying the identity in zero knowledge
Let us get into the details of the identity veri cation process. Recall that Party A should not get any knowledge from the interaction with U, but only be convinced that U is a proper user. To this end, U commits on a few numbers, and by A's request, U opens a few of them. A learns nothing from seeing the opened commitments, but if U tries to cheat, A catches him with a constant probability. Thus, repeating the process O(log(1= )) times, A is convinced that indeed U has a proper identity with probability 1 ? . User U begins by encrypting a, i.e., selecting uniformly at random R 2 Z q and computing the encryption ( ; ) = (g R ; Y R a), which he sends to A. Next, U partitions a; b and R into shares in the following manner. For b and for R the user U chooses a random sum modulo q. Namely, he chooses 1 The number a equals q with (negligible) probability 2=(p ? 1).
uniformly at random b 1 ; R 1 We rst describe the tests on a high level; a more detailed explanation follows. We rst specify some of the commitments that U makes. These commitments are the ones needed to state the high level tests, but more commitments will be required by the implementations of these tests. for greatest e ciency they use an improvement due to Cramer based on the techniques of 9]. In their scenario, the prover commits on the value a (which has to be in the right range) by committing on each of the bits in its binary representation. However, these and other such protocols depend intimately on how the value is committed to; the commitment method we use (a is committed to as a product of committed values, a 1 and a 2 ) precludes the direct use of this solution.
In 20], we give a simple cut-and-choose type proof for this commitment format; which is omitted here due to space limitations.
Features of the identi cation system
The interactive proof establishes that the identi er has a valid certi cate (a; b) and that he has escrowed the value of a. We know of no way of generating valid certi cates, or of generating a new certi cate from a number of other valid certi cates. Thus, heuristically, this argues that the rst-tier identi cation is valid and that the second-tier identi cation has been escrowed. However, we note that as with the group-signature based scheme, the escrow agent needs the issuer's help to revoke anonymity. Without the escrow agent, the zero-knowledge proof only reveals the El Gamal probabilistic encryption of a valid certi cate, so the second-tier identity seems secure.
The protocol is weakly separable in the same way as with the groupsignature scheme: the escrow agent must be involved during the initialization and needs the issuer's help to revoke anonymity.
The escrow agent only sees a, but doesn't receive b. However, the issuer can impersonate any identi er.
